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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ELJOE MADDOX, 
Appellant. 
[lJ Criminal Law-Appeal-Objections-Evidence.-The rule that 
admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in 
the absence of proper objection in the trial court is not appli-
cable to appeals based on admission of illegally obtained evi-
dence in cases tried before the decision in People v. Oahan, 
44 Ca1.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905. 
[2J Searches and Seizures-Presumptions.-In the absence of evi-
dence to the contrary, it is presumed that officers acted legally 
in entering premises to make an arrest and in seizing evidence 
incident thereto. 
[8] Arrest - Without Warrant -Reasonable Cause.-Where an 
officer had defendant's home under surveillance for about a 
month and had observed known narcotics users frequenting it, 
and information was given by one user to the officer that he 
had been to defendant's home and had taken a shot of heroin, 
there was reasonable cause for defendant's arrest. 
[4J Criminal Law - Evidence - Evidence Obtained by Unlawful 
Seizure.-Evidence which was illegally seized is excluded on 
the ground that the government must not be allowed to profit 
by its own wrong and thus encouraged in the lawless enforce-
ment of the law. 
[6] Id.-Evidence - Evidence Obtained by Unlawful Seizure.-
illegal conduct that was entirely unrelated and collateral to 
securing evidence objected to does not render that evidence 
inadmissible. 
[8] Searches and Seizures -Reasonableness.-The primary pur-
pose of the constitutional guarantees relating to searches and 
seizures is to prevent unreasonable invasions of the security 
of the people in their persons, houses, papers and effects, and 
when an officer has reasonable cause to enter a dwelling to 
make an arrest and as an incident to that arrest is authorized 
to make a reasonable search, his entry and his search are Dot 
unreasonable. 
[2J See Cal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, 12 et seq.; Am..Jur •• 
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq. 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d. Arrest, § 10; Am.Jur., Arrest, § 48 et seq. 
[4J See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 127; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 393 
et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [lJ Criminal Law, § 1080; [2,6] Searches 
and Seizures, §I; [3J Arrest, 112; [4,5,11] Criminal Law, 1410; 
[7-10J Arrest, 113. 
) 
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[7] Arrest-Making Arrest.-Suspects have no constitutional right 
to destroy or dispose of evidence, and no basic constitutional 
guarantees are violated because an officer succeeds in getting 
to a place where he is entitled to be more quickly than he 
would had he complied with Pen. Code, § 844, relating to de-
manding admittance before breaking open the door of the 
house in which the person to be arrested is, or in which the 
officer has reasonable grounds for believing him to be. 
[8] ld.-Making Arrest.-Since the demand and explanation re-
quirements of Pen. Code, § 844, as prerequisite to breaking a 
door or window in making an arrest, are a codification of t1te 
common law, they may reasonably be interpreted as limite<1 
by the common-law rules that compliance is not required if 
the officer's peril would have been increased or the arrest 
frustrated had he demanded entrance and stated his purpose. 
[9] ld.-Making Arrest.-When an officer has reasonable grounds 
to believe a felony is being committed and hears retreating 
footsteps in a house, the conclusion that his peril would be in-
creased or that the felon would escape if he demanded en-
trance and explained his purpose is not unreasonable. 
[10] ld. - Making Arrest. - Where an officer's right to invade 
defendant's privacy clearly appears, there is no compelling 
need for strict compliance with the demand and explanation 
requirements of Pen. Code, § 844, to protect basic constitu-
tional guarantees. 
[11] Criminal Law-Evidence - Evidence Obtained by Unlawful 
Seizure.-When there is reasonable cause to make an arrest 
and search and the facts known to an officer before his entry 
in a house are not inconsistent with a good faith belief on his 
part that compliance with the demand and explanation re-
quirements of Pen. Code, § 844, is excused, his failure to 
comply with such requirements does not justify the exclusion 
of evidence he obtains. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ala-
meda County and from an order denying a new trial. James 
R. Agee, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for selling heroin and for maintaining a place 
for the purpose of selling, giving away, or using heroin. 
Judgment of conviction affirmed. 
Eljoe Maddox, in pro. per., and Clinton Wayne White, 
under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Leo. J. Vander Lans, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Respondent. 
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TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant was found guilty by a jury 
of two counts of selling heroin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11500) 
and one count of maintaining a place for the purpose of 
selling, giving away, or using heroin. (Health & Saf. Code, 
§ 11557.) His motion for a new trial was denied, and judg-
ment was pronounced against him. He appeals from the judg-
ment and the order denying his motion for a new trial. 
Roy Cleek testified that on June 23, 1954, he visited de-
fendant's home in Oakland and bought a $10 "paper" of 
heroin, as he had done many times in the preceding six 
months. He used defendant's equipment to take a shot of 
heroin and left it on the kitchen table. Both Cleek and Joe 
Davis testified that at about 3 :30 p. m., Davis. came to de-
fendant's residence, bought a "paper" from defendant, and 
used the same equipment to take a shot of heroin. Shortly 
after 4 :30 p. m. Cleek and Davis left the premises and had 
not gone far when they were arrested by Officers Taylor 
and Hilliard of the Oakland Police Department. Officer 
Taylor testified that he had the premises under surveillance 
for about a month, that he saw known users of narcotics 
frequenting them, and that on. June 23d he and Officer Hil-
liard arrived at their lookout a few minutes before Cleek and 
Davis left defendant's home. Davis told the officers that he 
had been to defendant's home and had taken a shot of heroin. 
Officer Taylor and Davis then went to defendant's door and 
knocked. Officer Taylor heard a male voice say, "Wait a' 
minute" and also heard the sound of retreating footsteps. 
He kicked the door open and rushed to the kitchen where 
he saw defendant with a spoon in his hand . running 
toward the bedroom. He grappled with defendant, who threw 
the spoon into the bedroom. He found a small parcel con-
taining two hypodermic needles, a syringe, and an eye dropper 
on the kitchen table. There were traces of heroin on the 
. spoon. Within two hours after the officers arrived, seven 
persons came to the premises, five were known to Officer 
Taylor as narcotics users, and a sixth had· needle marks on 
his arm. 
Defendant testified in his own behalf and denied that he 
had sold heroin to Cleek or Davis or had ever had heroin in 
his possession. Cleek was a friend of his who visited him 
that day for a friendly conversation, and Davis came to dis-
cuss a new fender for defendant's car. After Cleek and 
Davis left, defendant discovered the parcel on the kitchen 
table and concluded that one of his visitors had left it. He 
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denied any knowledge of the spoon or having it in his hand 
when Officer Taylor entered. 
Defendant contends that the spoon and hypodermic equip-
ment were illegally obtained and therefore inadmissible. The 
attorney general contends that the officers had reasonable 
cause to arrest defendant for the commission of a felony, 
that they could lawfully enter his premises to make the arrest, 
and that the seizure of the evidence was lawful as an inci-
dent to the arrest. He also contends that since no objection 
was made in the trial court, the admissibility of the evidence 
cannot be challenged for the first time on appeal. 
[1] This case was tried before the decision in People v. 
Cahan,44 Ca1.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905]. We held in People v. 
Kitchens, ante, p. 260 [294 P.2d 17], that the rule that the 
admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in 
the absence of a proper objection in the trial court, is not 
applicable to appeals based on the admission of illegally 
obtained evidence in cases tried before the decision in the 
Cahan case. [2] In such cases, however, in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the officers acted 
legally. (People v. FaN'ara, ante, p. 265 [294 P.2d 21].) 
[3] Moreover, in the present case Officer Taylor had defend-
ant's home under surveillance for about a month and had 
observed known narcotics users frequenting it, and the in-
formation Davis gave him before the arrest was reasonable 
cause for the arrest. (See People v. Boyles, 45 Cal.2d 652, 
656 [290 P.2d 535] ; Pen. Code, § 836, subd. 8.) 
Defendant contends, however, that the arrest was illegal 
because Officer Taylor did not comply with Penal Code, sec-
tion 844. That section provides: "To make an arrest, a 
private person, if the offense be a felony, and in all cases 
a peace-officer, may break open the door or window of the 
house in which the person to be arrested is, or in which they 
have reasonable grounds for believing him to be, after having 
demanded admittance and explained the purpose for which 
admittance is desired." It is undisputed that Officer Taylor 
did not demand admittance and explain the purpose of the 
demand before he kicked in defendant's door. 
The question is thus presented whether or not evidence 
obtained by a search incident to an arrest must be excluded 
when the officer has reasonable cause to make the arrest and 
search but fails to comply with the requirements of section 
844. In previous cases we considered the requirements of 
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it unnecessary to determine whether a violation of either 
section without more compels exclusion of evidence obtained 
at the time of an arrest, since those sections were complied 
with (see e.g., People v. Martin, supra, 45 Ca1.2d 755, 762-763 
[290 P.2d 855J ; People v. Rios, ante, p. 297 [294 P.2d 39] ; 
Willson v. Superior Oourt, ante, p. 291 [294 P.2d 36]), or 
the evidence was otherwise unlawfully obtained. (See People 
v. Oahan, supra, 44 Ca1.2d 434.) 
The answer to this question must be sought in the basic 
reasons for the exclusionary rule. We considered those rea-
sons again in People v. Martin, ''II/pra, 45 Ca1.2d 755, and 
expressly rejected the theory that evidence is excluded to 
redress or punish a past wrong. [4] The evidence is excluded 
"on the ground that the government must not be allowed 
to profit by its own wrong and thus encouraged in the 
lawless enforcement of the law." (45 Ca1.2d at p. 761.) 
[5] Accordingly, we held in the Martin case and in People 
v. Boyles, supra, 45 Ca1.2d 652, 654, that illegal conduct 
that was entirely unrelated and collateral to the securing of 
the evidence objected to does not render that evidence in-
admissible. (See also Rogers v. Superior Oourt, ante, pp. 
3, 10-11 [291 P.2d 929].) An example of such conduct 
would be the failure to comply with the requirements of Penal 
Code, section 841,· which are analogous to the requirements 
of section 844. If the officer has reasonable cause to make an 
arrest, a violation of section 841 would be unrelated and 
collateral to the securing of evidence by a search incident to 
the arrest, for what the search turns up will in no way depend 
on whether the officer informed "the person to be arrested 
of the intention to arrest him, of the cause of the arrest, 
and the authority to make it." 
The demand and explanation requirements of section 844 
present a more difficult problem. The officer's compliance 
with them will delay his entry, and eases might arise in 
which the delay would permit . destruction or secretion of 
evidence so that what the search turns up would depend on 
the officer's compliance with the section. In other cases, 
however, the evidence may not be readily disposed of, and in 
·"The person making tlle urrest must inform the person to be arrested 
of the intention to arrest him, of tlle CIluse of tlIe arrest, and the 
authority to make it, except when the person to be arrestt'd is actually 
engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit an offense, or ill 
pursued immediately after its l'ommission, or after an escape." 
) 
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still others it may be impossible to determine whether or 
not the evidence would still have been available had there 
been the delay incident to complying with the section. 
[6] It must be borne in mind that the primary purpose 
of the constitutional guarantees is to prevent unreasonable 
invasions of the security of the people in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, and when an officer has reasonable cause 
to enter a dwelling to make an arrest and as an incident to 
that arrest is authorized to make a reasonable search, his 
entry and his search are not unreasonable. [7] Suspects have 
no constitutional right to destroy or dispose of evidence, 
and no basic constitutional guarantees are violated because 
an officer succeeds in getting to a place where he is entitled 
to be more quickly than he would, had he complied with 
section 844. [8] Moreover, since the demand and explanation 
requirements of section 844 are a codmcation of the common 
law, they may reasonably be interpreted as limited by the 
common law rules that compliance is not required if the 
officer's peril would have been increased or the arrest frus-
trated had he demanded entrance and stated his purpose. 
(Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166, 170 [10 Am.Dec. 110]; see 
Rest., Torts, § 206, com. d.) Without the benefit of hind. 
sight and ordinarily on the spur of the moment, the 
officer must decide these questions in the first instance. 
[9] When, as in this case, he has reasonable grounds to be-
lieve a felony is being committed and hears retreating foot-
steps, the conclusion that his peril would be increased or that 
the felon would escape if he demanded entrance and ex-
plained his purpose, is not unreasonable. In this proceeding 
we are not concerned with whether or not the officer's failure 
to do so would have justified defendant in using force to 
protect his person or property, or whether or not a jury in 
a trespass action might conclude that reasonable cause for 
the officer's failure to comply with the demand and explana· 
tion requirements did not exist. [10] Moreover, since the 
officer's right to invade defendant's privacy clearly appears, 
there is no compelling need for strict compliance with the 
requirements of section 844 to protect basic constitutional 
guarantees. (Cf. People v. Boyles, 81tpra, 45 Ca1.2d 652. 
656; People v. Cahan, 81tpra, 44 Ca1.2d 434, 442, footnote.) 
[11] We conclude therefore that when there is reasonable 
cause to make an arrest and search and the facts known to 
him before his entry are not inconsistent with a· good faith 
belief on the part of the officer that compliance with section 
) 
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844 is excused, his failure to comply with the formal re-
quirements of that section does not justify the exclusion of 
the evidence he obtains. 
The judgment and order are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., 
concurred. 
Shenk, J., concurred in the judgment. 
CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment of affirmance be-
cause I believe that on the record before us the officers had 
reasonable grounds to believe that defendant was engaged 
in the commission of a felony at the time the search was 
executed and that the evidence obtained as the result of 
the search was therefore admissible against him. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied March 21, 
1956. 
